



Coalition of distributed generation units to 
Virtual Power Players – a game theory 
approach 




Abstract. Smart Grids (SGs) have emerged as the new paradigm for power system operation and management, being designed 
to include large amounts of distributed energy resources. This new paradigm requires new Energy Resource Management (ERM) 
methodologies considering different operation strategies and the existence of new management players such as several types   
of aggregators. This paper proposes a methodology to facilitate the coalition between distributed generation units originating 
Virtual Power Players (VPP) considering a game theory approach. The proposed approach consists in the analysis of the classifi- 
cations that were attributed by each VPP to the distributed generation units, as well as in the analysis of the previous established 
contracts by each player. The proposed classification model is based in fourteen parameters including technical, economical and 
behavioural ones. Depending of the VPP strategies, size and goals, each parameter has different importance. VPP can also man- 
age other type of energy resources, like storage units, electric vehicles, demand response programs or even parts of the MV and 
LV distribution network. A case study with twelve VPPs with different characteristics and one hundred and fifty real distributed 
generation units is included in the paper. 
 







1.1. Background and aim 
 
The increase of distributed generation (DG) and 
other types of Distributed Energy Resources (DER), 
such as demand response, storage systems and electric 
vehicles [35] has brought about new challenges to the 
electrical network’s operation [11], mainly to the dis- 
tribution system and electricity markets [6]. The high 
penetration of several types of DER in power systems 
 
 
can be a reality in a near future [2] requiring that all 
electricity markets and power system players are able 
to face the new challenges [27] considering an hierar- 
chical and distributed level of decision with a high in- 
formation dependency level [4]. 
Despite the favourable scenario for the growth of 
DER, there are important aspects to consider, both of 
economic and technical nature [16]. Issues such as the 
dispatch ability (namely in wind and photovoltaic tech- 
nologies), the participation of small producers, con- 
sumers and storage units in the electricity market in- 
creases the need for new approaches and new rules to 
integrate these resources into a competitive environ- 
ment context [9]. 
Virtual Power Players (VPPs) aggregate multi- 
resource, multi-technology and multi-site heteroge- 
neous entities, which can enable overcoming some  of 
 
  
the most critical problems [18]. One of the main tasks 
of VPPs is the coalition process of distributed genera- 
tion units and other energy resources’ owners. Coali- 
tion process is crucial for the success of the VPP, aim- 
ing to establish profitable contracts with low energy 
acquisition prices. Each VPP can have different coali- 
tion goals, considering not only the energy price, but 
also many other parameters with high relevance for 
the VPP. During the coalition process, VPPs should 
consider several aspects such the expectable genera- 
tion costs, dispatchability, reliability, installed power 
capacity use, life cycle, volatility, complementary mar- 
kets, location, GEE emissions, installed power capac- 
ity, type of technology, social impact, technology ma- 
turity and commercial behaviour. 
Several VPPs can actuate in the same region, trying 
to aggregate the same players (owners of different dis- 
tributed energy resources) negotiating in the same mar- 
kets and using the same electric network. This means 
that a largely competitive environment between VPPs 
can be expected. The use of game-theory algorithms 
can be included in decision support tools, providing 
useful information for the VPPs and for all other play- 
ers that act in this competitive environment. 
The increasing of competition in electricity sector 
increased significantly in the last years with the sec- 
tor liberalization [3]. In this competition environment 
the use of Noncooperative and Cooperative game the- 
ory methods can provide decision support solutions in 
different situations. As example, in [32] a cooperative 
game theory method is proposed to deal with the seller- 
to-buyer matching in microgrids perspective. Also to 
be used in microgrids, in [40] a noncooperative game 
theory method is proposed to control the energy re- 
sources. The approach intents to determine the equilib- 
rium between the generation and the consumption. The 
method considers the controllable generation and the 
flexible behaviour in the demand side. 
More focus in  the electricity market  environment, 
[39] evaluates game-theoretic solution and competitive 
equilibrium for different kinds of market considering 
the Nash equilibrium and its refinements for several 
variants of the architecture for oligopolistic electricity 
markets. An auction game model for analyzing strate- 
gic behaviour in pool-based electricity markets is intro- 
duced in [7,28]. An incentive mechanism based on the 
signalling game theory is proposed in [14] and short- 
term electricity market auction using game analysis is 
considered in [34]. Concerning the strategies to wind 
farms participation in electricity markets a game the- 
ory and stochastic programming is proposed in [37]. A 
vision of next-generation retail electricity market with 
high penetration of distributed residential electricity 
suppliers is proposed in [36] considering an innovative 
game theoretic framework. 
All the mentioned approaches uses the game the- 
ory to manage the offers (buying/consumption or sell- 
ing generation). Instead, in this paper, the game theory 
approach is used to support the agents’ coalition. The 
most important contribution comprises: 
– A classification method of distributed generation 
units to be used by the aggregators. This classifi- 
cation method allows ordering the DG unit by a 
merit order according the aggregator preferences 
and strategies. The classification method consid- 
ers fourteen classification parameters considering 
technical, economical and behavioural ones. Each 
aggregator can consider the total or only a part of 
parameters, assigning different weights for each 
one; 
– The use of a game theory approach  for  deci- 
sion support in the coalition negotiation process. 
Based in the classification process and in the ne- 
gotiation history, this method allows determining 
the best negotiation strategy considering different 
negotiation scenarios. 
VPPs and DG are modelled as agents [8,23] in a 
multi-agent based electricity market simulator called 
MASCEM (Multi-Agent System for Competitive Elec- 
tricity Markets) [25,29]. In MASCEM, each market 
player is a complex and autonomous entity with dis- 
tinct objectives, purposes and behaviours, taking their 
own decisions. The complexity of dynamic market 
players, their interaction and medium/long term gath- 
ering of information (data and experience in the mar- 
ket) is therefore modulated in it. In MASCEM, each 
agent intends to obtain a best results as possible (max- 
imise the incomes to sellers and minimize the out- 
comes to buyers) considering its technical characteris- 
tics and generation/consumption profiles and flexibil- 
ity. The agents can adapt the strategies according their 
market performance. To constantly improve its perfor- 
mance and to adapt the strategy to the current environ- 
ment, each agent includes a learning mechanism [38] 
to evaluate the success in each negotiation session ad- 
justing the initial strategy if required. 
 
1.2. Virtual Power Player 
 
Virtual Power Player can be defined as a market 
player that aggregates several types of Distributed En- 




Fig. 1. VPP energy resources management. 
 
mand response, storage units, electric vehicles, load 
consumption and a part of the distribution network (see 
Fig. 1) [17,30]. 
The main task of VPPs is to coordinate the DER 
operation and to participate in the electricity markets 
to sell and/or to buy energy according to the aggre- 
gated DER availabilities and necessities. In this paper 
the coalition between VPPs and DG units is addressed 
considering different VPPs profiles and strategies [26]. 
DERs have several advantages in being aggregated to 
a VPP, from which we point out the following ones: 
– Market participation – to negotiate the available 
or necessary energy in the market, an adequate 
staff is required. If associated to a VPP, the play- 
ers leave these issues for the VPP to manage. This 
strategy can also be applied to the other markets, 
such as carbon markets or district heating. It is 
still possible to define common strategies for act- 
ing in the market and for coordinating the gener- 
ation with consumer’s necessities; 
– Maintenance – the maintenance of generation 
units and storage systems can be ensured by the 
VPP. The main consequence is the maintenance 
cost reduction for their owners. If some players 
have similar technologies, it is possible to create 
stocks, as well as a single maintenance team for 
all the players; 
– Project – the experience acquired by the VPP will 
facilitate the new power plants licensing process. 
The advantages can be reflected at the bureau- 
cratic level and to obtaining credit advantages; 
– Forecasting – to ensure a good operation, VPPs 
need a set of techniques to adequately forecast the 
consumption, the generation, the electric vehicles 
mobility [33] and the electricity market price [12]; 
– Energy Resources Management – the energy re- 
sources management will be conducted by the 
VPP, which will ease the players’ operation; 
– Participation in demand response (DR) events – 
VPPs  should  manage  the  participation  of con- 
  
sumers and electric vehicles in DR events. VPPs 
can also develop specific DR programs dedicated 
to aggregated players. 
Despite the advantages, players may lose auton- 
omy and consequently prefer to manage their own re- 
sources, considering the higher risk associated to this 
option. 
 
1.3. Paper structure 
 
After this introductory section, Section 2 explains 
the proposed methodology and the coalition process. A 
case study is presented in Section 3. Finally, Section 4 
presents the most relevant conclusions of the paper. 
 
2. Distributed generation aggregation 
 
Players’ coalition is essential for the VPP creation 
and evolution, having high implications in all VPP 
structure and strategies. The negotiation process can be 
long and complex, therefore a very concrete definition 
of the objectives to reach is essential [1,15]. 
In order to improve the negotiation process, each 
participant entity must ensure an adequate preparation, 
including the negotiation planning (trying to predict 
all the possibilities of proposals, and meeting evolu- 
tion) [24]; the argumentation preparation, in a way that 
it can be coherent and consistent; and the study of the 
opposition profile, with the purpose of anticipating its 
thoughts and actions in different situations. This ap- 
proach allows the participants to preserve a good rela- 
tionship and it consists of five basic principles [13]: 
– Separating people from the problems; 
– Focusing on the interests rather than on positions; 
– Creating mutual gain options; 
– Persisting on objective (rather than subjective) 
criteria; 
– Developing alternatives for reaching an agree- 
ment. 
In the first step the VPP should define its global 
strategy (goals, mission, vision, etc.) and the market 
segment (aggregation of large-scale renewable based 
generation units, microgeneration units, CHP, etc.). 
Considering its global strategy, the VPP will try to de- 
fine metrics to evaluate the players and posteriorly use 
these metrics to classify the players in the market that 
can be aggregated. These processes ensure the people 
separation from the problems and also the focus on the 




Fig. 2. Negotiation process. 
 
ers’ classification, VPPs can define different negotia- 
tion strategies for each player. The negotiation is it- 
erative and can include several proposals and counter 
proposals. VPPs can re-classify the players in each it- 
eration considering the new conditions and the new 
knowledge about the players. Once the negotiation pro- 
cess is concluded, an evaluation of the results should 
be performed and the global strategies can be adjusted. 
In the following sub-sections a description of the ne- 
gotiation processes between the VPP and   distributed 
generation units are presented. 
 
2.1. VPP strategy and parameters weight definition 
 
The strategy of the VPP is partially imposed by the 
market segment desired by the VPP and by the estab- 
lished financial and trading energy goals [19]. How- 
ever, the VPP has to define the best strategy to achieve 
these goals, taking advantage of its market knowledge. 
This strategy shall define intermediate objectives for 
the processes, so that its evolution and the accomplish- 
ment of the established goals can be monitored. The 
VPP is able to change the initial strategies, depending 
on intermediate achieved results [26]. 
The adopted strategies and the goals to reach must 
be dynamic and flexible implying a constant analysis 
of the aggregated players and of the external players 
that can be interesting for aggregation in future nego- 
tiation processes. This evaluation should be continu- 
ously performed in order to start negotiations at any 
time. 
  
Defining objectives means establishing evaluation 
parameters for which targets can be attributed. Four- 
teen evaluation parameters have been considered, for 
which it is possible to define objectives and weights to 
be used by VPPs to give more or less importance to 
each parameter: 
– Expectable generation costs (gc)   – weight (ψgc); 
– Dispatchability (dp) – weight (ψdp); 
– Reliability (rl) – weight (ψrl); 
– Installed power capacity use (cu)  – weight (ψcu); 
– Life cycle (lc) – weight (ψlc); 
– Volatility (vl) – weight (ψvl); 
– Complementary markets (cm) – weight (ψcm); 
– Location (lt) – weight (ψlt); 
– GHG emissions (ce) – weight (ψce); 
– Power capacity (pc) – weight (ψpc); 
– Type of technology (tt) – weight (ψtt); 
– Social impact (si) – weight (ψsi); 
– Technology maturity (tm) – weight (ψtm); 
– Commercial behaviour (cb) – weight (ψcb). 
Each VPP must assign a relative importance to each 
parameter, and define a specific weight for each one, 
allowing the players’ classification. Depending of their 
goals and their market segment, VPPs can be classi- 
fied in different types [25]. In the present approach six 
VPP types are considered, with the following charac- 
teristics: 
– Parallel VPP (PVPP) – It includes different pro- 
ducers with distinct generation capacities, typi- 
cally larger than 1 MW and lower than 20 MW. 
The common characteristic of this type of VPPs 
is their participation in parallel markets (district 
heating, CO2, etc.); 
– Large Scale VPP (LSVPP) – It includes producers 
with large generation capacity, typically higher 
than 10 MW; 
– Global VPP (GVPP) – This type of VPP can ag- 
gregate all types of distributed energy resources, 
including the distributed generation, consumers 
with demand response contracts, storage systems 
including electric vehicles. Other important as- 
pect on this type of VPP is the capability of man- 
aging part of the distribution network; 
– Integrated VPP (IVPP) – This type of VPP is sim- 
ilar to the GVPP. However, the IVPP does not in- 
clude the distribution network management capa- 
bility. The IVPP can aggregate large scale energy 
resources; 
– Several VPP (SVPP) – This type of VPP does not 
have a priori defined characteristics, aggregating 





Fig. 3. Classification flowchart for generation units. 
 
– Micro VPP (μVPP) – This type of VPP is com- 
posed of many producers with small capacity, typ- 
ically lower than 2 MW. 
 
2.2. Players classification 
 
A player’s classification process was designed al- 
lowing the evaluation of each producer. Figure 3 
presents the classification process flowchart. 
The classification process uses the VPP’s goals to 
evaluate each producer. The knowledge about each 
player is different and VPPs use some history data to 
better characterize the player. For example, the VPP 
can assume the installed capacity use of a photovoltaic 
unit considering the installed capacity use of similar 
units in the same region. The information regarding the 
players can be improved during the negotiation pro- 
cess. 
Based in the VPP goals and in the producer char- 
acteristics, the VPP must execute a players’ pre- 
selection. Based on a small set of criteria it can imme- 
diately exclude the possibility of coalition. For exam- 
ple, specifying a players’ minimum or maximum di- 
mension, or imposing limits in CO2 and other GHG 
emissions. 
After the pre-selection, VPPs evaluate the produc- 
ers in each classification parameter described in Sec- 
tion 3.1. In order to become possible to compare clas- 
sifications assigned by VPPs, it is necessary to normal- 
ize the obtained values. In this approach, all classifica- 
tion values are normalized in a scale from −5 to 5, in 
VPP Goals History Data DG Data 
DG Pre-selection 






which the negative values are assigned to players with 
parameters outside the range of values that was defined 
as acceptable for the VPP. 
After the normalization process each parameter is 
multiplied by the weight that the VPP assigned to it. 
The final classification is achieved through a weighted 
evaluation of all parameters, according to Eq. (1). 
ClassVPP → Prod = 
gc × ψgc + dp × ψdp + rl × ψrl + cu × ψcu 
+lc × ψlc + vl × ψvl + cm × ψcm 
+lt × ψlt + ce × ψce + pc × ψpc + tt × ψtt 
+si × ψsi + tm × ψtm + cb × ψcb 
(1) 
In the classification process, VPPs must always con- 
sider the impact that each player is expected to have in 
the VPP’s structure, i.e., the VPP must bond the cur- 
rent value of the parameter under evaluation with the 
value it would reach if the player is aggregated to the 
coalition. In cases when the VPP is starting its opera- 
tion, there are no data available from its previous oper- 
ation. Therefore it should use the values defined as ob- 
jectives to execute the classification process, as well as 
the expected values for each parameter of each player. 
 
2.3. Negotiation strategy 
 
VPPs can have different strategies in the negotiation 
process using some decision support tools in order to 
identify the best one in different negotiation scenarios. 
VPPs compete with each other in order to obtain   ad- 
 
 
Fig. 4. Scenarios and proposals matrices. 
 
the deals that can be expected to be achieved when ne- 
gotiating with each of these players. This evaluation 
is used to create a matrix with the history of the pro- 
posed offers, which is used in the coalition offers de- 
velopment algorithm. Each VPP can establish a differ- 
ent parameter’s weight for the analysis of the contracts 
and for the classifications (2). As the history of previ- 
ous contract information Contprev is most of the times 
incomplete, VPPs will tend to assign higher weights to 
the classifications value ClassVPP → Prod. However the 
weights can be adjusted during the negotiation process 
considering the improvement of the knowledge regard- 
ing the players’ behaviour. 
vantages in the negotiation process. The use of a game 
theory based approach can be very important for the 
VPPs negotiation in order to define the best   strategy 
OfferGT = ClassVPP → Prod × ϑClass 
+ Contprev × ϑCont 
(2) 
considering different negotiation scenarios. 
Game theory can be applied in cases of interaction 
between players (people or entities) mutually aware 
that the individual result depends on and influences the 
actions of the others [5]. The first approaches concern- 
ing game theory have emerged in [20], having gained 
an increased importance after the publication of this 
concept in [21]. Currently, game theory is used in a di- 
versity of areas, such as math, economy, sociology, bi- 
ology, political science, psychology, computer science, 
among other [10,22,41]. 
The use of game theory in the coalition process con- 
sists in the analysis of the classifications that were 
attributed by each VPP to the distributed generation 
units, as well as in the analysis of the previous estab- 
lished contracts by each player. The analysis of the 
previous contracts that have been established by each 
player with other VPPs provides a strong indicator of 
VPPs define matrices considering different VPPs of- 
fers to each player. Matrices allow the best negotia- 
tion strategy definition in each scenario. The devel- 
oped algorithm considers three base scenarios (Fig. 4). 
The realistic scenario assumes that the other VPPs will 
maintain their behaviour, i.e. assuming they will use 
the same strategy of past negotiations. In the imple- 
mented method, each VPP can determine the impor- 
tance value of each player for the other VPPs consid- 
ering the same classification method but changing the 
parameters weights according to the knowledge about 
the other VPPs. The optimist scenario considers that 
the VPPs will place offers with values that are more 
favourable for the VPPs. The pessimist scenario con- 
siders proposals with higher advantages for the gener- 
ation units. 
After defining the distinct scenarios, new matrices 
are  created, representing the  possible  actions  that a 
 VPP 
(PayProd 
scenarios, from which the simulation results are 






Fig. 5. Scenarios analysis process. 
 
VPP can adopt. Each line of these matrices symbolizes 
the offers that a VPP presents to each generation unit. 
The offers are based on the reference values obtained 
from the combination of the players’ classification, and 
the analysis of the history data of previous contracts,  
if available. Since a wide range of alternative offers is 
required, several possible offers are generated. The re- 
sulting offers are tested against each of the considered 
scenarios. 
Each set of offers is represented by the nodes of the 
lower level, i.e., the “Offers” of the tree represented  
in Fig. 5. The intermediate nodes represent a defined 
scenario, each one with a set of offers. Each of these 
analysis “Scenarios” is conducted through a simula- 
tion, which results in a utility value. 
The utility value for each VPP (UVPP) is character- 
ized by the total amount of power that a VPP is able 
to achieve from the coalitions, as the sum of the power 
that is contracted with  each producer (PProd); and it  
is penalized proportionally to the weighted average of 
payments agreed with each generation unit (PayProd). 
This way, the utility value will be higher as the amount 
of achieved power gets closer to the amount that the 
VPP desires, and which contracts with players present 
the lower costs for the VPP. 
U = 
PProd 
its strategy to suit its acting profile and its objectives 
and long term strategy. For that, a decision method is 
used with the purpose of determining which set of ac- 
tions, or final offers, will be, in fact, presented as pro- 
posals to the players. Figure 6 presents the parameters 
used in the proposals definition. 
The proposed methodology considers six decision 
methods, which correspond to six different VPP acting 
profiles. The considered profiles comprise: 
– The realistic method is used as the reference case. 
The values proposed by the VPPs are simply 
based on the classifications assigned by each VPP 
to each player, so that these results can be com- 
pared to the other decision methods, and hence 
conclusions can be taken about the advantages of 
the use of each method; 
– The pessimist method represents the typical case 
of a cautious VPP, i.e., the usual minimax method 
application. In this case, the chosen scenario is the 
one in which the worst results were achieved (the 
worst scenario a VPP can find – mini), and the 
chosen set of offers is the one that got the best 
results for this scenario (max); 
– On the contrary, the optimist method will opt for 
the scenario with the highest simulation advan- 
tages, being chosen the best set of offers for this 
scenario; 
– The probable method was implemented to deal 
with the variation of the probability of being able 
to account for a credible history of contracts with 
the players. Therefore, this method allows that 
when this history is not available, or the informa- 
tion able to be retrieved from that data is not suf- 
ficient, only the scenarios based on the classifica- 
tions are considered; 
– The tight method considers for the scenario anal- 
ysis only the proposals that are equal or inferior 
to the reference values obtained from the history 
analysis of classifications and contracts; 
– Finally, the gluttonous method considers only the 












The proposals generated by the decision method are 
the offers that are effectively considered for the negoti- 
=     
(Pay × PProd) 
ation with players, from the VPP whose actions are be- 
ing supported by the decision method based on  game 
Depending on the evaluation values for each set of 
offers in the considered scenarios, each VPP can adjust 
theory. Figure 6 – Scenarios and proposals definition 
in game theory algorithm 
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3. Case study 
Fig. 6. Scenarios s and proposals definition in game theory algorithm. 
 
history of previous contracts has been built manually, 
since there is no available data to be used regarding this 
This case study  intends  to  show  the  application 
of the classification and negotiation mechanisms pre- 
sented in this paper. In order to make this case study as 
realistic as possible, 150 real generation units were se- 
lected from a data base which includes approximately 
40.000 units from Spain [31]. The producers were se- 
lected considering the average capacity of power units 
of each technology and the number of units of each 
technology in a specific region of Spain. Additionally, 
12 VPPs with multiple characteristics and objectives 
are considered. The number of VPPs was defined in or- 
der to understand the developed processes, considering 
a competition between players but also different goals 
and market segments position. 
The real available characteristics of generation units 
are the technology, the installed power capacity, the lo- 
cation, and the year of entry into service. The other 
classification elements were established according to 
the expected values for each generation technology. 
All information regarding the producers’ characteris- 
tics can be consulted in www.gecad.isep.ipp.pt/IES. 
Figure 7 presents the classification results. 
The simulation of the negotiation process between 
VPPs and players, using the proposed game theory ap- 
proach, uses the classifications presented in Fig. 7, and 
a history of previous contracts signed by each player. 
In opposite side to the classification process, which 
was based on real data from the generation units,   the 
aspect. 
In order to test the proposed methodology, several 
scenarios have been built considering the use of game 
theory model by all VPPs, and also the use by only 
one VPP. Regarding the scenarios for which all VPPs 
use game theory approach, four possibilities have been 
tested: 
– All VPPs adopt the Realistic strategy (based on 
the classification of the players), with weight of 
1 for the classification, and weight of 0 for the 
history of previous contracts; 
– All VPPs adopt the Realistic approach, with 
weight of 0.5 for both the classification and the 
history of previous contracts; 
– All VPPs adopt the Probable strategy, with weight 
of 1 for the classification and weight of 0 for the 
history of previous contracts; 
– All VPPs adopt the Probable approach, with 
weight of 0.5 for both the classification and the 
history of previous contracts. 
Table 1 presents the VPPs aggregations results by 
technology using game theory for all VPPs consider- 
ing a Realistic strategy and the weight 1 to the players’ 
classification. The numbers in the table represent the 
aggregated players. The column of power (P) shows 
the aggregated capacity and inside the parenthesis the 


























Fig. 7. Classification attributed by the VPPs the production units. 
 
gated power capacity and the VPPs goals it is possible 
evaluate the success in the negotiation process. 
Figure 8 presents the aggregations results using 
game theory for all VPPs considering different scenar- 
ios. Since the VPPs present very different scales, it was 
necessary to divide the figure into two in order to eas- 
ily show the variations instigated by the change in pa- 
rameters. 
From Fig. 8 it is possible to see that using the Real- 
istic strategy, even by changing the weight for classi- 
fications and contracts, the results are kept unchanged. 
However, when using the Probable profile, significant 
changes are verified in the coalition results. VPP 1 and 
VPP 10 are the most penalized ones, as in this context 
they were not able to aggregate any generation unit. 
Analysing the obtained results in Realistic strategy, 
and taking into consideration that not all VPPs com- 
pete against each other, it is visible that the VPPs that 
got the worst results were VPP 6 and VPP 12 (VPPs 
with less aggregated capacity when compared with the 
required ones). VPP 6 is a LSVPP, which competes di- 
rectly with the other LSVPPs, with the IGVPP, and in 
some cases with SVPPs and PVPPs. These VPPs   try 
to aggregate players with high installed power capac- 
ity. VPP 12 is a μVPP and competes with VPP 10 and 
VPP 11, and not so directly with VPP 1 (GVPP), VPP 
7 (SVPP), and VPPs 8 and 9, which are of the type 
PVPP. 
Taking these results into consideration, we decided 
to apply the proposed game theory  methodology to 
the two VPPs that got the worst results (VPP 6 and 
VPP 12), to understand if their results can be improved 
using this method. Each one of the two VPPs will    
be tested with different acting profiles (Realistic, Pes- 
simistic, Optimistic, Probable, Tight, and Gluttonous). 
Figure 9 shows the results obtained for VPP 6, and 
Fig. 10 shows the results obtained for VPP12. 
In Fig. 9 it is possible to see the impact in aggrega- 
tion results of game theory use only by VPP6. It is also 
important to refer that, excluding the Gluttonous de- 
cision strategy, which originates the non-aggregation 
of any player. All other strategies originate notoriously 
better results for VPP 6 when compared to the probable 
and realistic methods (results in Fig. 8). 
From Fig. 10 it is possible to see the change in the 
decision method used by VPP 12 only interferes with 
  
Table 1 
Coalitions results for each VPP using the classification method 
VPP Photov. CHP Wind Small hydro Biogas WTE Biom. Micro turbine P (MW) 
1 – – – 114; 115 127 –  – 1.12 (1) 
2 – – 96; 98; 116 – – – – 125 (148) 
   99; 101;       
   108; 110       
3 – 80; 81;  112; 113 128; 130 132–135; 141 148; 149 159 (200) 
      138–140    
  86; 88;        
  91; 94        
4 – 85 102; 105 – – – 142 – 105 (500) 
5 – – 97; 100; – – – – – 182 (500) 
   104; 106;       
   107; 109       
6 – – – – – – 144 – 21 (200) 
7 – 76–79; – – – – 143 – 16.2 (25) 
  82–84;        
  87; 89;        
  90; 92;        
  93        
8 – – – – 121 – – – 1.3 (20) 
9 – – – 117 122–126; 131; 137 145 – 15.2 (15) 
     129     
10 1–17; – – – – – – – 0.76 (1) 
 19–23;         
 25–67;         
 69–74         
11 – 95 – 111; 120 – 136 – – 0.63 (1) 
12 18; 43; – – 118 – – – – 0.37 (1) 
 68; 75         
N.A. – – 103 119 – – – 146; 147; 5.9 















Fig. 8. Results of the coalition process with all VPPs using game 
theory approach for: (a) VPPs of types IVPP, LSVPP, SVPP and 






Fig. 9. Results of the coalition process with VPP 6 using game theory 
approach for: (a) VPPs of types IVPP, LSVPP, SVPP and PVPP; (b) 








Fig. 10. Results of the coalition process with VPP 12 using the game 
theory approach for: (a) VPPs of types IVPP, LSVPP, SVPP and 
PVPP; (b) VPPs of types GVPP and µVPP. 
 
 
Fig. 11. Utility values of VPP 6 in each of the considered scenarios. 
 
the aggregation of VPPs of type μVPP, which are direct 
competitors of VPP 12. Once again, the Gluttonous de- 
cision method originates the aggregation of no play- 
ers, while all the other decision methods have shown a 
huge improvement in VPP 12 results. 
Figure 11 presents the comparison of the utility val- 
ues (UVPP) that evaluate the performance of VPP 6  
in each of the scenarios. UVPP, as shown in Eq. (3), 
presents higher values when the total volume of aggre- 
gated power increases, and as the paid price for this 
power decreases; i.e. UVPP potentiates the achieve- 
ment of large amounts of aggregated power at the 




Fig. 12. Utility values of VPP 12 in each of the considered scenarios. 
 
From Fig. 11 it is possible to see that, comparing to 
the four reference cases (in Fig. 8), which are repre- 
sented by the first four bars of the graph of Fig. 11, 
the game theory methods have presented much higher 
utility values. With the exception of the Gluttonous 
method, which resulted in no aggregations, and the Re- 
alistic method, which achieved an utility value equal 
to the first two reference methods; all other game the- 
ory based methods have originated better results for 
VPP6. This supports the conclusion that, not only the 
game theory methods provide larger aggregated power 
amounts, but also at lower prices. The best example is 
the third reference scenario (third bar from the graph – 
Probable (Cl = 1; Ct = 0)), which has originated a sim- 
ilar amount of aggregated power for VPP 6 (as can be 
seen from Fig. 8) when compared to the four game the- 
ory methods that originated the best results (see Fig. 9). 
However, even though gathering the same amount of 
power, the achieved utility value is much lower, which 
means that the same amount of power was aggregated 
at the cost of much higher payments. 
Figure 12 presents the utility value comparison for 
VPP 12 in all the considered scenarios. 
Figure 12 shows that, from the six game theory 
methods, three were able to nearly double the utility 
value of the reference cases. Two others achieved sim- 
ilar utility values to those of the reference cases, and 
the Gluttonous method achieved a null value to its in- 
ability to gather any aggregated power. An important 
conclusion to be taken from Fig. 12 is that, besides 
the fact that the game theory methods were able to po- 
tentiate the results of VPP12, the methods that were 
able to achieve the best results were the Probable, Pes- 
simistic, and Tight methods. Comparing to the results 
of VPP6, one can see that these three methods were 
able to achieve good results for both VPPs. However, 
in the case of VPP 6 (Fig. 11) the method that achieved 
the best results from all (even better than these  three) 
  
was the Optimistic method. The Optimistic method 
was not able to maintain the good results for VPP 12. 
From this, the conclusion to be taken is that the Prob- 
able, Pessimistic, and Tight methods are the most re- 
liable ones, and show to be capable of achieving very 
good results regardless of the supported player. The 
Optimistic method, on the other hand, is the method 
that achieved the best results for VPP 6, but it did not 
perform as well for VPP 12; i.e. this method is a riskier 
approach, which is able to achieve the best results from 
all methods, but it does not offer guarantees of success. 
Considering the obtained results, the VPPs, in this 
case the VPP6 and VPP12, should analyse what is the 
best strategy to adopt in real negotiation, trying to iden- 
tify the most probable real negotiation scenarios and 




The negotiation between VPPs and generation units 
is crucial for the success of VPPs’ operation. The 
more advantageous the coalition contracts are, the 
most competitive the VPP can become. However, it is 
important to preserve the interests of the entities that 
own the generation units, because VPPs operate in a 
competitive market, in which players can aggregate to 
other VPPs, or, in some cases, participate directly in 
electricity markets, without necessarily requiring the 
coalition with a VPP. 
In this paper it has been proposed the use of the 
game theory approach for decision support in the coali- 
tion negotiation process between VPP and distributed 
generation producers, considering all the required con- 
of this method for supporting their decisions. Once the 
proposed method was applied to these VPPs, the qual- 
ity of their results clearly increased. Different strategic 
profiles and decision methods led to different results, 
some of them more advantageous than others, yet all 
perfectly applicable and notoriously advantageous for 
the decision support in the coalition formation process. 
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